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THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL
EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIAN FAITH:
A CRITIQUE OF A KIERKEGAARDIAN VIEW
C. Stephen Evans

If we assume that Christian faith involves a propositional component whose
content is historical, then the question arises as to whether Christian faith
must be based on historical evidence, at least in part. One of Kierkegaard's
pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, argues in Philosophical Fragments that
though faith does indeed have such an historical component, it does not
depend on evidence, but rather on a first-hand experience of Jesus for which
historical records serve only as an occasion. I argue that Climacus' account
is coherent, and that on such a view historical evidence is not sufficient for
faith for anyone. However, in contrast to Climacus, I argue that evidence
might still be valuable and even necessary for some people. The resulting
danger that the decision about faith might become a question for scholarship
is best met, not by insulating faith from historical scholarship, but by recognizing the ability of faith to supply a context in which the evidence available
is sufficient.

While no one would wish to identify Christian faith with propositional belief,
traditional Christians hold that Christian faith does involve, include, or presuppose certain propositional beliefs. Among these beliefs some are historical
in character. For example, traditional Christians believe that Jesus suffered
under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, buried, and rose again from the dead, and
they also hold that these beliefs are central components of their faith.
I have already said that faith cannot simply be identified with these beliefs,
or any set of propositional beliefs. Faith is a trusting commitment which
transforms a person and leads to eternal life. For the Christian this faith
consists in or is made possible by a relationship to an historical person, Jesus
of Nazareth, but one could hardly be consciously related to a person about
whom one had no beliefs at all. So the traditional view that faith involves
historical belief is plausible.
That view, however, raises a number of weighty problems concerning the
relationship of faith to history. One of the most important concerns the relation of faith to historical evidence. If faith includes historical beliefs, then it
seems plausible that faith would not be reasonable unless it were reasonable
to hold the historical beliefs in question. Ordinarily, historical beliefs are held
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on the basis of historical evidence of various types. Is it the case, then, that
people should only seek to develop and maintain Christian faith if there is
sufficient historical evidence to make the historical beliefs that are a component of that faith reasonable?
1. Faith and History in Philosophical Fragments

This question is explored at some length by Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous character S0ren Kierkegaard created to be the author of Philosophical Fragments. (In what follows I shall defer to Kierkegaard's wish to cite
the pseudonymous authors when referring to his pseudonymous works.) In
this work Climacus presents what he terms a thought-experiment. He first
describes what he terms the "Socratic" view of "the Truth," a term which is
here close to the religious concept of salvation. On the Socratic view, each
person has the Truth within already, and a relationship to the divine can
thereby be presupposed in every person. He then asks whether any alternative
to such a view can be imagined, and proceeds to "invent," with clear ironical
and humorous touches, a view that suspiciously resembles Christianity, according to which the Truth must be brought to the individual by a god who
becomes a human being in order to make it possible for the individual to
receive the Truth. A relationship to the divine is thus made possible by the
god's historical appearance.
I shall assume that Climacus' thought-experiment is presented in order to
illuminate the nature of Christian faith, as Climacus himself clearly says at
the conclusion of the book, and that the significant features of this experiment
are to be taken as features of Christian faith as well. When this assumption
is made, Climacus' thoughts on the relationship between faith and historical
evidence are quite unusual when compared with most Christian thinkers, and
their oddity stems from what appears to be an internal tension.
On the one hand, Climacus wants to maintain there is an essential difference between Christianity and Greek modes of thought, a difference which
depends on the historical component of Christianity. Climacus could say with
respect to Christianity what Johannes de Silentio says about faith in Fear and
Trembling: Either Christianity is something essentially different from what
Socrates could have come up with, or else Christianity does not exist, "precisely because it has always existed. "I In such a case, Christianity as a unique
phenomenon would not exist because it would simply be a specific version
of a generic human religiosity. Climacus locates the essential distinguishing
feature of Christianity in the historical entrance of the God into history. A
real alternative to Socratic "immanence" (a Kierkegaardian term for any view
that regards the Truth as something human beings possess or can attain using
only their own unaided natural powers) requires that we deny that the Truth
is in us, even in the form of a potentiality for recognizing the Thuth. 2 The
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Truth as well as the capacity to recognize the Truth must be brought to us by
a God who enters history. So any attempt to replace the Jesus of history with
a mythical figure whose real significance lies in the existential meaning of
the narrative, or in the content of the teaching must be rejected. 3 The objectivity of the historical is required in order to get "the God outside yourself."4
This emphasis on history is, however, coupled with a depreciation of historical knowledge as in any way necessary or sufficient for becoming a
disciple. Climacus seems to make historical knowledge virtually irrelevant
to faith:
Even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except
these words, "We have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared
in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died"this is more than enough. The contemporary generation would have done
what is needful, for this little announcement, this world-historical nota bene,
is enough to become an occasion for someone who comes later, and the most
prolix report can never in all eternity become more for the person who comes
later. s

The unusual nature of Climacus' ideas is now clear. More commonly, those
who have held that the incarnation was a genuinely historical event in something like the traditional sense, however varied that sense may be, have also
held that it was important to have good historical evidence for that event.
Those who believe we do not have such evidence, but still wish to affirm a
faith in Christ as the divine lord, have tended to reinterpret the incarnation
as a symbol whose power does not rest on its objective historicity.
The question I wish to pose is whether the conjunction of the claim that
the historical is essential with the claim that historical evidence is unimportant makes sense. If not, the question of which to modify would still be open.
Both traditional Christians as well as those more liberal Christians still engaged in the quest for the historical Jesus would argue that what must go is
the cavalier dismissal of historical evidence. These groups have been suspicious of Kierkegaard for what they perceive as his irrationalism. Many contemporary theologians, on the other hand, convinced that making faith
dependent on historical evidence is a recipe for disaster, would argue that
what must go is the assumption that faith must be grounded in factual historical events.

2. Reasons for Making Faith Independent of Historical Evidence
I believe that Climacus has strong reasons for wishing to avoid both of
these recommendations. Whether those reasons are ultimately decisive, and
indeed whether there is really a coherent alternative to the revisions his critics
would urge upon him remains to be determined. There are several reasons
why he wishes to avoid making faith dependent on historical evidence. I shall
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discuss two of those reasons briefly at this point, postponing a look at the
third and final reason until later.
The first reason is that if faith were dependent on historical evidence, it
would violate a commitment to a kind of egalitarian principle of justice to
which Climacus is committed. Climacus believes that the attainment of the
Truth must somehow be equally available to people of every generation.
"Would the god allow the power of time to decide whom he would grant his
favor, or would it not be worthy of the god to make the reconciliation equally
difficult for every human being at every time and in every place .... "6 If faith
were dependent on historical evidence, then it would be very difficult to
satisfy this principle, since it would appear that eyewitnesses or those with
greater access to the historical records would have an advantage.
Actually, it is not easy to see how this egalitarianism could be satisfied by
a faith with historical, propositional content, even if that faith is not based
on historical evidence, since it would be difficult for those people who have
not even heard of the events to have any beliefs about them, even if they do
not need historical evidence to believe them. Perhaps, Climacus can find a
way to surmount this problem, however. He might assume that God somehow
supplies people with the content of what they must believe, either in this life
or after death. 7 Alternatively, the principle of equality might be restricted to
those who have had a fair chance to hear of the historical events in question.
Perhaps it is only their salvation that depends on attaining the right kind of
historical faith, and those in a different situation are not measured by the
same standard. If so, then one can see how the claim that faith does not rest
on historical evidence introduces a greater measure of equality within the
group of people who have heard the news. In any case, Climacus has other
reasons for not allowing faith to depend on historical evidence.
A second reason is what might be called the incommensurability between
authentic religious commitment and matters of intellectual evidence. This
theme, which is more developed in Postscript than in Fragments, focuses on
the character of Christian faith, which has about it an absoluteness and finality.s A person of faith is someone who is willing to risk her life and stake
everything on what she believes. The evidence for an historical event can
never be more than probable and tentative, subject to revision in light of new
findings. Climacus thinks that if faith were based on evidence, it would
necessarily share in this tentativeness. He wants to see faith as a life-transforming passion but does not see how such a passion could be engendered
by calculation of evidential probabilities. Hence he does not wish to see faith
as something that depends on evidence whose quality necessarily fluctuates
as new discoveries are made and further inquiry is carried out.
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3. Why Historicity Matters

On the other hand, Climacus wishes to resist giving up the objective historicity of the incarnation because it is the actual historicity of the incarnation
that makes possible a revelation that can confront and correct my deep-rooted
assumptions about God and myself. If I am indeed sinful, and if those deeply
rooted assumptions are wrong, then the possibility of such a revelation is not
to be dismissed in a cavalier way. The incarnation makes Christianity what
is termed in Postscript a religion of ~transcendence." Transcendence is important here not only for its possible value as a corrective and challenge to
my individual errors and pride; it also represents the foundation of any genuinely human social order.
The established social order constantly attempts to deify itself; that is the
secret of Christendom, which is merely the attempt to employ Christianity to
do what human societies always do. To foil this human attempt at self-deification, epitomized in the Hegelian political philosophy, we need a God who
is truly transcendent, so that the established order can be seen in its relativity,
and the possibility of critical dissent be kept open. Despite Kierkegaard's
own political conservatism, there is a radical element to his social and political thought, an element that is tied to transcendence. Without a transcendent
God in time, who speaks to us from ~outside" our innate religious consciousness, we humans will manufacture God in our own image, and we will do so
to buttress the status quo. Any attempt to substitute for the historical incarnation a "myth" or ~story" or "symbol" whose factual truth is unimportant
inevitably transforms Christianity into a ~Socratic" view that assumes that
our religious consciousness does possess the Truth.
Despite these reasons for holding both to the historicity of the incarnation
and the irrelevance of historical evidence, Climacus' view is problematic. Is
it possible to believe that Jesus Christ lived and died for me as the Son of
God, and be indifferent to critical questions about the factuality of my beliefs? Suppose, to push things to the extreme, that it could be shown that
there was no first-hand evidence at all, and that overwhelmingly powerful
evidence appeared that the New Testament was concocted in the fourth century. In such a situation would a person not naturally doubt whether Jesus
had lived at all, and accordingly doubt whether or not he was indeed divine?
One could at this point retreat to the view that the object of faith is simply
that the god has appeared somewhere, sometime. However, the content of
faith would in that case seem distressingly vague, a blank canvas that will
have little power to jolt and overturn our current Socratic ideas. Does such
a vague historical claim really differ much from a Socratic myth? M. J.
Ferreira puts the point by noting that genuine historical events have identity
conditions if we are meaningfully to refer to them. 9 If we want to say that
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something occurred in history that is the foundation of our faith, but how it
occurred can be left to the historians as unimportant, the question arises as
to whether what occurred can be completely divorced from how it occurred.
Ferreira claims that we need at least some information about an event in order
to identify the event. Think, for example, of Moses. Moses is the individual
who confronted Pharaoh, led Israel out of Egypt, inscribed the ten commandments, and so on. Some or much of this information may be inaccurate, but
if we had no reliable information about Moses whatsoever, then it is hard to
see how we could have any true beliefs about Moses, because we could not
use the symbol "Moses" to successfully pick out an historical figure. In the
same way, it would appear that to speak meaningfully about Jesus as the
historical incarnation of God, we need some accurate historical information
about Jesus. And if it is important for our information to be historically
accurate, how can we avoid a concern for the quality of the historical evidence?
4. Faith as Epistemologically Basic

Climacus' answer to this problem lies in a view of faith which sees faith
as epistemologically basic, in something like Alvin Plantinga's sense of the
term. 1o A basic belief is one that is not held on the basis of any other beliefs
or any evidence that is propositional in character. Basic beliefs are therefore
not held on the basis of any inference or argument, though they may have
what Plantinga calls a ground in the circumstances or experiences that evoke
them. Plantinga holds that some beliefs are properly basic; that is, in certain
circumstances certain persons may hold these beliefs without violating any
intellectual duty or evidencing any epistemic fault or defect. Though this is
controversial, I believe that Climacus thinks that Christian faith is not only
basic, but properly basic for the believer.
Climacus says that faith is a passion that is the result of a first-hand encounter between the individual and the incarnate GOd. 11 Historical records
function as the occasion for this encounter, but what matters is the encounter
itself, in which God grants the individual "the condition" of faith. "By means
of the contemporary's report (the occasion), the person who comes later
believes by virtue of the condition he himself receives from the god. "12 Thus,
the encounter is itself the ground of faith, which is therefore not based on
evidence in the sense that it is not based on arguments or inferences from
any propositions whose probability must be evaluated. No amount of historical evidence is sufficient to guarantee that this encounter will occur or that
faith will be its outcome, and no specific amount of historical evidence is
necessary in order for the encounter to occur or faith to ensue. Climacus
insists that the encounter is one that can as easily lead to offense as to faith.
He supports his claims here with two thought experiments. One can easily
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imagine a person who has all the evidence one could want of an historical
sort, but who has not thereby been transformed through a meeting with God
incarnate. 13 One can also imagine someone with very slender historical knowledge whose life has nevertheless been transformed by a meeting with God
which that scant information made possible. 14 Implicit in all this, I believe,
is the Christian conviction of the living Christ. Jesus is no mere dead historical
figure, but a living person who can still be experienced by individuals.
So on my reading Climacus' answer to Ferreira is to steadfastly maintain
that objectivity in the content of one's beliefs is compatible with subjectivity
in the grounds. It is undeniable, I think, that to meaningfully believe in Jesus
as God one must have some true historical beliefs about Jesus. But why must
those beliefs be based on evidence? Why couldn't the beliefs be themselves
produced as part of the outcome of the encounter?
To successfully refer to Jesus of Nazareth, some of my beliefs about Jesus
must be true, but it seems possible that a person might believe in the historical
record because of her faith in Jesus, rather than having faith in Jesus on the
basis of the historical record. Of course if the beliefs are false, then they are
false, and the person is mistaken, but that risk is unavoidable, and Climacus
does not think one should try to avoid it. Nor does the fact that the belief in
question is not based on evidence mean that the belief is arbitrary or groundless, since it is grounded in the first-person encounter with Jesus. IS What is
required is that this encounter be an experience of Jesus in which true knowledge is given. The situation is analogous to a case of ordinary sense perception in which I come to believe that there is a flower before me because I
directly perceive the flower. In such a case I do not normally regard the
existence of the flower as something that I infer or conclude on the basis of
evidence.
One objection to Climacus' attempt to rest so much on an experience of
Jesus as God is that such an experience necessarily rests on a host of background assumptions. Surely a person cannot simply directly come to perceive
Jesus as forgiving them, commanding them to do something, or inviting them
to faith in the pages of the gospels unless the gospels are indeed an accurate
representation of Jesus, which provide a reliable means for becoming aware
of Jesus at work in one's life. In a similar way, ordinary sense perception
also depends on the truth of various background assumptions. For example,
I could not perceive that there is a flower in front of me if the light was not
normal, if my eyesight was not functioning normally and so on. To know that
there is a flower in front of me these other things must be true. Similarly, to
know that the historical person Jesus, whom I learn about through historical
records, is God speaking to me, certain other things must be true as well. So,
in both cases, it may be argued, my belief still rests on other evidence, namely
the evidence I have for these background beliefs.
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This kind of objection rests on a confusion of levels. 16 We should distinguish between having a ground for a belief and knowing that one has a ground
for a belief, between being justified and knowing that one is justified. For
my belief that there is a flower before me to be properly grounded, it is
necessary that the light be of a certain sort, that my eyesight be functioning
normally, and so on, but it is not necessary for me to know these things, or
to have evidence that they are so. It is sufficient that they are true. To know
that my belief is properly grounded I may need to know such things, but that
is another matter. In a similar manner, in order to have a properly grounded
belief that Jesus is God, it must be the case that Jesus reveals himself in
certain ways. But it is not necessary for the individual to know these other
things, or have evidence for them, though that may be necessary for the
individual to know that her belief is properly grounded.
I conclude that Climacus' position is philosophically defensible, in the
sense that there is nothing incoherent in the notion of an historical belief
which is grounded in an experience, rather than historical evidence. Whether
that is in fact how Christian faith is produced is another matter, of course.
To decide that one must decide whether Jesus is indeed God and whether
experiences of Jesus of the appropriate sort are possible.
5. The Relevance of Historical Evidence for Faith

To revert to the language of the "thought-experiment," Climacus is probably right in saying that the "scrap of paper" with the words "we have believed
that the god appeared among us" could be "more than enough" to be an
occasion for faith, should God choose to use that scrap of paper as an occasion
to reveal himself. And he is clearly right in saying that no amount of evidence
will necessarily produce faith in someone. So strong, historical evidence is
neither sufficient nor necessary for faith. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept
the further conclusion he seems to draw, namely that evidence is simply
irrelevant to faith.
My worry can be expressed as follows: Certainly God could use a scrap of
paper to produce faith. Perhaps he often does produce faith in ways that make
evidence irrelevant. But is this always or even normally the case? Since my
belief in Jesus is a belief with historical content, it cannot be isolated from
my other historical beliefs. Unless God produced my belief by over-riding
my normal thought-processes, it is hard to see how I could regard massive
evidence that Jesus never existed, or never said any of the things attributed
to him, as utterly irrelevant to my faith. Even a belief which is "properly
basic" and grounded in direct perceptual experience is subject to being overridden by contrary evidence. My perceptual belief that there is a live flower
in front of me may be overridden, for example, by strong evidence that the
object in question is plastic. Similarly, even though I believe that Jesus has
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revealed himself to me, is it not possible that I am mistaken, and is not the
liveness of that possibility affected by the quality of the evidence I have for
Jesus' historical reality?
I believe that the basic worry Climacus has about admitting the relevance
of historical evidence for faith is that he does not want the question of faith
to be a scholarly question. He does not want to leave the ordinary person who
is deciding whether to be a Christian or not in the clutches of the historical
scholars, with their endless debates and never-decided controversies. After
all, the individual who must decide whether or not to become a Christian is
making a decision about how her life should be lived. She does not have the
luxury of waiting for the scholars to reach agreement, which will never
happen in any case. I sympathize with Climacus' worry on this point, but I
believe that this concern can be met without the drastic claim that historical
evidence is irrelevant for faith. The actual situation with regard to historical
evidence seems to be this. For orthodox Christians, the historical accounts of
Jesus' life are regarded as reasonably accurate at least, plenty sufficient for
faith, and the evidence for this conclusion is regarded as adequate. For others,
the account is much less accurate, and the evidence accordingly less powerful. In extreme cases, skepticism extends to almost all the details of Jesus'
life. However, all parties would agree that in reality there is far more evidence
than Climacus' "scrap of paper." How much more is a matter of dispute.
Now why is it that the evidence seems adequate to one party and inadequate
to the other? Doubtless each side will have its own preferred explanation.
Perhaps skeptics will say that wish fulfillment is at work in the believer.
Perhaps believers will follow Climacus and say that their own encounter with
Jesus is the deciding factor. What I wish to maintain is that it is possible for
the believer to follow Climacus in saying this without claiming that historical
evidence is irrelevant. That is, it is possible for a believer to claim that it is
significant that we have as much evidence as we have, and even to admit that
some people would not find faith to be possible if they did not have evidence
of reasonable, even if not decisive quality. while still properly believing that
the decision is not in the end one which scholarship can settle. Though the
evidence by itself would never be sufficient to produce faith in anyone, it is
possible that evidence of a certain type might be necessary for faith for some
people, though not everyone, since not everyone will have the reflective bent
or cognitive capacities to appreciate the force of various possible problems.
Faith in this case does not make evidence unimportant or irrelevant; it makes
it possible properly to appreciate and assess the evidence, at least so as to be
able to know that one's beliefs have not been vanquished by various
"defeaters ...
To go back to the level distinction we employed earlier, for some people,
those of a certain reflective bent, being justified in believing may be linked
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to believing that they are justified. They want to know that they are justified,
and if they lack such knowledge, their faith may be troubled by crippling
doubts. Or, more modestly and more plausibly, I think, they at least need to
rule out the possibility that their beliefs can be shown to be false. They may
need this because they have encountered people who claim to be able to show
that their beliefs are false. Such a believer who is troubled by doubt might
admit the relevance of historical argument, while still holding to the Climacus-inspired view that what is finally decisive in settling the argument is his
own first-hand experience of Jesus.
Such a person is not necessarily thrown back into the clutches of the
scholars, even though he may not ignore the work of the scholars altogether.
To avoid the specter of an unending scholarly inquiry which never leads to
commitment either way, he may only need to believe that there is enough
evidence to make the truth of his beliefs possible, and it is hard to see how
that weak conclusion could be threatened by scholarship. What the believer
must hold is that the evidence is good enough for one whose belief has the
ground of a first-person encounter, or perhaps even that the evidence is seen
in a different light for one who has had such an encounter. In the latter case
the encounter could be understood as transforming the individual, giving her
the proper perspective from which to view the evidence, or even as giving
her the capacities she needs to appreciate its forceY It may be important to
have evidence, but the evidence does not need to be of the type that would
convince any "sane, rational person," but rather be such as to appear adequate
to a person of faith. A view such as this one seems to me to make more sense
of the way committed believers actually respond to disturbing historical evidence. The usual stance is not dismissal of the evidence as irrelevant, but
confidence that the contrary evidence will not be decisive.
6. Evidence for a Paradox: Making the Improbable Probable

Climacus has one further reason for treating historical evidence as insignificant, which might be called the "capital crime" argument. Just as a capital
offense "absorbs all lesser crimes," so the paradoxicalness of the incarnation
makes minor historical problems insignificant. 18 The idea is that the incarnation, being a paradox, is so improbable as to appear absurd. The viability of
belief in such a paradox cannot be affected by petty details of the historical
records, such as divergencies and contradictions of various witnesses. Its
antecedent probability is so low that it cannot be made meaningfully lower;
nor could resolving such problems make the probability meaningfully higher.
Climacus goes so far as to argue that to try to make the incarnation probable
is to falsify its character. The paradox is by definition the improbable, and
one could make it probable only by making it into what it is not. 19
These arguments are strikingly reminiscent of Hume's famous critical at-
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tack on miracles. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume
argues that it could never be reasonable to believe that a miracle has occurred,
because a miracle, which is by definition an exception to the laws of nature,
is necessarily as improbable an event as can be imagined, since the laws of
nature describe what normally happens and therefore what one can reasonably
expect to occur. Even the best and strongest evidence for a miracle imaginable would only serve to balance and could never overcome this strong a
priori improbability. 20
It is worth inquiring, both for Climacus and Hume, what concept of probability and what assumptions about probability seem to underlie the arguments. The term "probability" is used in both objective and sUbjective senses.
Objectively, to say that an event is probable is to say that it is objectively
likely to occur. Thus the probability of a certain outcome when cards are
dealt or dice are rolled can be calculated with some precision. We often say
that an event is probable, however, when we know nothing about the objective
probabilities of the matter. In these cases we mean that it seems likely to us
that the event will occur. For example, I may think it is probable that I wil~
receive an exceptionally large raise in salary next year, even though I have
no statistical data on which to base such a claim. It is simply rooted in my
belief that my work will be recognized and rewarded by the proper authorities. Such a claim is more an expression of my expectancies than it is a
statement about statistical frequencies in the objective world, and such a
probability claim is no stronger than the subjective beliefs on which it is
based.
Hume's argument appears at first glance to be rooted in objective probability, since it is the infrequency with which laws of nature are violated which
makes a miracle improbable. Critics have pointed out, however, that if this
is Hume's argument, then it seems to rest on a shallow understanding of how
the probability of historical events is estimated. The probability of an historical event cannot be estimated simply from the frequency with which an event
of that type occurs, since history is replete with unique events. A French
emperor may invade Russia only once in all human history. In estimating the
probability of an event, we rely therefore not only on the frequency of the
type of event in question but our total knowledge of the situation, including
our knowledge of the intentions and characters of whatever historical agents
are involved. To think otherwise is to confuse history with dice-rolling or
coin-tossing.
Believers in miracles regard miracles as the work of God, who is regarded
as a personal agent. To assess the probability of a miracle, therefore, one must
do more than consider how frequently they occur. One must consider whether
there is a God, whether he is the sort of being who could be expected to do
miracles from time to time, in what circumstances this could be expected to
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occur, and so on. If I believe in a personal God, and believe that God has the
ability to intervene in nature, and that he is a being who has good reasons to
intervene in nature in certain circumstances, then I will estimate the probability of a miracle in those circumstances much more highly than does Hume.
Anyone who judges miracles extremely improbable, as does Hume, bases the
judgment not merely on objective statistical data, but on a variety of beliefs
about other matters. Of course it is possible that Hume or others who judge
miracles extremely improbable have objectively powerful evidence that God
does not exist, or that God is not the kind of being who performs miracles,
but it seems more likely to me that Hume is actually simply expressing his
beliefs about these matters, and the judgment of probability made is therefore
of the subjective kind. It seems or appears likely to Hume that miracles do
not occur, but of course miracles may not appear nearly so improbable to
someone else who holds different convictions about God. Anyone who actually believes that a miracle has occurred will of course believe that the
objective probability of that miracle is 1.
I believe that the concept of probability that underlies Climacus' argument
is also subjective. Climacus says that the believer must firmly hold to the
notion that the incarnation is a paradox and is therefore improbable. However,
since the believer thinks the incarnation has actually occurred, he cannot
believe that the objective probability of the event is low, since the objective
probability of an event that has occurred is 1. The meaning must be that the
believer understands the event as one that will appear improbable to someone
who holds certain beliefs. For example, someone such as Hume who believes
that miraculous events are in general improbable, will certainly make the
same judgment about the idea of a divine incarnation. Anyone who is inclined
to think that only events that can be rationally understood can occur, and who
also cannot understand how God could become a human being will think the
event improbable. Anyone who is inclined to believe that genuinely unselfish
love does not exist will find the idea of God suffering on behalf of human
beings similarly improbable. All of this implies that the improbability of the
incarnation must be seen as relative to the perspective from which it is
viewed.
This conclusion corresponds perfectly with Climacus' own contention that
the paradoxicalness of the paradox is a function of sin, which creates the
"absolute qualitative distance" between God and human beings.2! If, however,
the improbability of the paradox is a function of the subjective perspective
from which it is viewed, why is the idea of viewing the paradox as probable
wrong-headed, as Climacus plainly says? Why is it that the perspective of
sinful human beings gains a kind of authority here as the defining perspective? Why shouldn't the believer assert that it is probable to her?
The answer surely lies in the fact that Christianity assumes that human
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beings are in fact sinners. This perspective is in fact the perspective that every
human being occupies, at least prior to faith. And since the transition from
sin to faith is not, for Climacus, a one-time event, but a transition that must
continually be renewed, it remains necessary for the believer to define the
content of her faith polemically, as that which necessarily is in opposition to
the thinking of sinful human beings. The believer is not offended but the
believer is the person who has confronted and continues to confront the
possibility of offense. If faith loses its provocative character, and no longer
confronts our natural patterns of thinking as a rebuke, it has indeed essentially
altered its character. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the incarnation
is no longer improbable to the believer, simply because it is for her something
that has occurred. It is improbable only in the sense that she knows it appears
unlikely or improbable to our sinfully corrupted patterns of thought. The
event remains improbable in that it was not something we expected to occur.
Does the subjective improbability of the paradox imply that the quality of
the historical evidence is no concern? It might appear so for the unbeliever,
since the event will appear to him to be massively improbable. Whether this
is so depends on how pervasive the corrupting effects of sin are on the
intellect. However, I believe that the claim that evidence is of no value
whatsoever to the unbeliever is not strictly implied by the requirements of
Climacus' hypothetical version of Christianity. The hypothesis requires that
people be construed as sinful enough so that they cannot arrive at the Truth
apart from an encounter with God in which they receive the condition. It is
not obvious to me that one aspect of this process of giving the condition could
not consist in giving the individual evidence that the God-man is indeed God.
Of course the individual's sinfulness may give him a strong tendency to
dismiss this evidence, because the fact in question appears so improbable to
him. But it seems possible that strong evidence might chal1enge this presumption of improbability. So long as we are careful to insist that the evidence
alone could not produce faith in the individual, then this seems compatible
with Climacus' view. No reversion to a Socratic view has occurred.
It also seems possible for evidence to have some value to the believer.
Climacus' view to the contrary is surely rooted in his claim that the faith
which is the result of the first-person encounter with God does not rest on
such evidence. If such a faith is sufficient to overturn the subjective improbability of the event, it will surely not be troubled by flaws in the historical
record.
This is essentially the same argument we examined in the previous section
and is subject to the same reservations that I expressed there. Perhaps it is
true that it is the experience of meeting Jesus that is decisive in altering the
natural judgment that God would not become a human being. Thus the experience may be the decisive ground of faith, and the inconclusiveness of
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scholarly debate may be insignificant to the believer. However, this is compatible with claiming that it is important that there be evidence, at least for
some people who are troubled by doubts of a certain kind. The evidence may
not be of such a nature as to convince unbelievers, but it may be the kind of
evidence that is seen as sufficient when seen through the right eyes.
After all, it is surely possible for someone to doubt whether the experience
of Jesus which is the ground of faith is veridical. If we have some reasons to
think that Jesus really existed, and really is divine, and has a certain character,
and so on, such information could be helpful in resolving such doubts. If I
have an experience of someone who appears to be Mother Teresa, I will be
much more likely to believe the experience is veridical if I have background
information about the reality of Mother Teresa, and about her character, than
would be the case if I had never heard of Mother Teresa. Thus the traditional
arguments for the reliability of the gospels, and the testimony provided in the
gospels for the claim that Jesus is divine, including the miracles, Jesus' own
claims to be divine, the profundity of Jesus' teaching, and especially the
resurrection, could be of significance to a believer. They are not sufficient
to produce faith, and perhaps not strictly necessary, but they may well be part
of what one might call the normal process by which faith comes into being,
and they may also have value in confirming faith that is present, helping to
relieve doubts and aIIay various objections.

7. Traditional Apologetic Arguments
There is little doubt, I think, that the claims I am making run strongly
contrary to the intentions of Climacus, who simply can see no value in
traditional apologetics. It is instructive to look at Climacus' treatment of what
is traditionally cited as evidence. Climacus admits that the god must make
his presence known in the world in some way, though he says that every
"accommodation for the sake of comprehensibility" is of no value to the
person who does not receive the condition, and is therefore "elicited from
him [the god] only under constraint and against his will. "22 I do no't see why
this should be so.
As Climacus himself says, it surely makes no sense to suppose that the god
is literaIIy indistinguishable from any other human being, and that there is
no sign which points to his divinity. Of course the gospels meet this requirement in the case of Jesus by presenting him as an authoritative teacher, a
worker of miracles, and someone who himself claims to be divine. If the god
wills to reveal himself, and if this requires some sign or evidence of his
divinity, then it is hard to see why the god should grant such signs only "under
constraint and against his will." Even if we grant Climacus the claim that
such signs will only be of value to people of faith, though I have given reason
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to question that claim, it does not follow that the signs are insignificant for
those people who do indeed have faith.
Climacus says that miracles cannot help much, as a miracle does not exist
immediately, but "is only for faith." It is not clear just what this means. The
statement could be read as saying that an event becomes a miracle by my
belief that it is. However, this claim is absurd on its face, and in any case
directly contradicts a principle Climacus firmly holds, namely that the apprehension of something cannot alter the nature of what is apprehendedY If he
means that miracles will only be believed by those who have faith, this is
possible, though not obvious, but that does not mean that the miracles lack
evidential value for those who do possess faith.
Surely Climacus is right when he says that miracles and other evidence do
not lead automatically to faith, and that they can indeed lead to offense. If
the gospels are accurate, many contemporaries of Jesus observed him perform
miracles without becoming disciples, and in fact seem to have been offended
by him. However, this does not imply that the miracles are of no value to
those people who did possess faith. Certainly, the traditional Christian view
is that the "signs" Jesus did are valuable in this way. For example, Peter's
first sermon on the day of Pentecost appeals to the "mighty works, signs and
wonders" which God had done among the people through Jesus. 24 So far as
I can tell, Climacus' deviation from this traditional Christian view and complete denigration of historical evidence is unwarranted, even given the basic
correctness of his own view of faith and its genesis in the individual.
There is therefore no way to completely insulate Christian faith from the
risks of historical criticism. On the other hand, an understanding of the way
such historical judgments themselves embody faith-commitments may make
it possible for Christians to argue that the historical beliefs that are part of
their faith are reasonable enough when viewed in the right context, that
context being a faith which is grounded, not in historical evidence, but in a
first-hand encounter with Jesus Christ. 25
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